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Burdens of Proof: Degrees of
Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or
Constitutional Guarantees?
C.M.A. McCauliff*
Courts and commentators have recognized for some time that trial
burdens of proof refer to the degree of belief a factfinder must reach to
deem a fact true. They also have recognized that one can express
these degrees of belief in terms of probabilities. In this article Profes-
sor McCauliff suggests that one can use probability theory to analyze
the standards governing various other factual determinations as bur-
dens of proof. She argues that these standards lie along a continuum
that requires increasing certainty of decisionmakers. Professor Mc-
Cauliff uses this concept to demonstrate the ambiguity in the stan-
dards governing these decisions and the inconsistency that ambiguity
causes. To illustrate further the ambiguity of these standards, Profes-
sor McCauliff presents the results of a survey of all federal judges in
which she asked the judges to give an absolute numerical definition of
the certainty required by each of nine "burdens of proof" standards.
Professor McCauliff concludes that because of the ambiguity of these
standards, the standards confuse the decisionmakers they were in-
tended to aid and endanger the interests-often constitutional
rights-they were intended to protect.
I. INTRODUCTION
The most familiar connotations of "burdens of proof' are the
jury instructions alerting the trier of fact that the prosecution
must convince the jury of guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt," or
that a "preponderance of the evidence" is sufficient to decide the
outcome of a civil case. Even with respect to these commonplace
uses of burdens of proof, confusion exists about whether "burden
of proof' refers to the objective quantum of evidence or to the sub-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. A.B.,
1965, Bryn Mawr College; Ph.D., 1969, University of Toronto; J.D., 1975, University of Chi-
cago. The author would like to acknowledge the cooperation of the many federal judges who
filled out a questionnaire on burdens of proof or submitted comments, favorable or unfavor-
able, on the questionnaire. The author would like to express her thanks to Dean Roy L.
Steinheimer of Washington and Lee University School of Law for his encouragement and
support during the research and writing of this Article. He created the climate which made
possible the pursuit of scholarly interests.
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jective conviction of certainty in the mind of the trier of fact. Pro-
fessor McBaine in his classic article on burden of proof argues that
the concept refers to degrees of belief in the mind of the deci-
sionmaker rather than the intrinsic quality of the evidence to
which the phrase "preponderance of the evidence" first directs the
attention of the trier of fact.1 Indeed, the terms "preponderance of
the evidence," "clear and convincing evidence," and "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" are three separate and distinct criteria that the
trier of fact may use to arrive at a conclusion. "Degrees of belief' is
in essence a metaphor to express the results of the decisionmaking
process. Burdens of proof are guidelines to degrees of belief that
facilitate the decisionmaking process.
Jury instruction, however, is not the only context in which the
application of burdens of proof arises. The traditional burdens of
proof phrases are only a representative selection of a whole series
of phrases that express a similar decisionmaking function for triers
of fact other than juries or judges. These other phrases include the
various stages of certainty required in a search and seizure con-
text-such as "reasonable suspicion" and "reasonable" or "proba-
ble cause to believe"-and appellate and administrative review
standards-such as "clearly erroneous" and "substantial evi-
dence."' Moreover, as in the case of traditional burdens of proof,
commentators disagree about whether these terms refer to the
quantum of evidence or to the conviction of certainty in the mind
of the factfinder.3 In addition, any discussion of burdens of proof
1. McBaine, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REv. 242 (1944) [herein-
after cited as McBaine, Burdens of Proof]. Some commentators interpret "preponderance of
the evidence" to indicate the quantity of the evidence. See, e.g., E. MORGAN, BASIC
PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 23 (1962). Professor McBaine argues that Rule 1 of the Uniform
Rules of Evidence, which provides that a fact may be proven "either by a preponderance of
the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt, as the case
may be. . . .," UNiz. R. Evm. 1 (act superseded 1974) encouraged this dichotomy between
degrees of belief and quanta of evidence. McBaine, Burden of Proof. Presumptions, 2
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 13, 14 (1954) [hereinafter cited as McBaine, Presumptions]. Professor Ball
suggests that the dichotomy between objective and subjective approaches to burdens of
proof reflects the division of thought between the inductive theory of probability and the
frequency theory of probability. Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Stan-
dards of Proof, 14 VAND. L. REv. 807 (1961).
2. At first glance these phrases seem foreign to traditional burdens of proof. The ana-
lytical inspiration for treating all of these phrases as burdens of proof arises from Judge
Weinstein's application of degrees of belief in the search and seizure context, see United
States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), and Judge Weinstein's discussion of the
burden of proof that judges must apply in a presentence hearing, see United States v. Fat-
ico, 458 F. Supp. 388 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
3. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
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also must take account of the Supreme Court's recent delineation
of the constitutional function of burdens of proof at trial.4
This Article analyzes the whole range of burdens of proof as
well as their constitutional implications. Part H of the Article dis-
cusses the traditional burdens of proof and the use of probability
theory in legal factfinding. Part HI of the Article studies the deci-
sionmaking processes of law enforcement officers, the judges that
review their decisions, and the decisionmaking processes in appel-
late and administrative review. Part IV of the Article returns to
the trial process and analyzes burdens of proof, not as degrees of
belief, but as reflections of constitutional due process that mandate
a required degree of belief for the trial of certain important rights.
Part V of the Article reports the results of a survey of judges on
the meaning of various burdens of proof. Finally, the Article con-
cludes that the objective-subjective dichotomy is an attempt to ex-
press at pretrial and posttrial stages the same policy concern that
the Supreme Court has set forth at the trial level: the importance
of the interests at stake. The proliferation of new burdens of proof,
however, obscures and endangers these interests by confusing the
decisionmakers who must apply them.
II. DEGREES OF BE F
The theory of decisionmaking for most categories of cases
tried-criminal, serious personal rights, ordinary civil suits-is
clear: "When people take their disputes to court, or the state pros-
ecutes an alleged offender for a crime, what has happened in the
past must be determined."5 Determinations of past events, how-
ever, cannot recreate those events with perfect knowledge. "Time
is irreversible, events unique, and any reconstruction of the past is
at best an approximation. As a result of this lack of certainty about
what happened, it is inescapable that the trier's conclusions be
based on probabilities."' In other words, because the trier of fact
never can be absolutely certain that a particular fact is true, the
parties only can persuade him to a particular degree of certainty
4. Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982).
5. McBaine, Presumptions, supra note 1, at 15.
6. J. MAGUIRE, J. WEINSTMN, J. CHADBOURN & J. MANSFIELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EVIDENCE 1 (6th ed. 1973). The inductive process rests on the theory of probability. "Perfect
knowledge alone can give certainty, and in nature perfect knowledge would be infinite
knowledge, which is clearly beyond our capacities. We have, therefore, to content ourselves
with partial knowledge-knowledge mingled with ignorance, producing doubt." W. JEVONS,
PRINCIPLES OF SCIENCE 224 (Am. ed. 1874).
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that the fact is probably true. The study of burdens of proof from
the point of view of the factfinder thus turns upon a description of
how persuaded the factfinder must be by the evidence before him.
Once the trier of fact makes a decision in accordance with the re-
quired probability ("beyond a reasonable doubt," "clear and con-
vincing evidence," or "preponderance of the evidence"), the finding
is "true" for the purposes of entering judgment and settling the
dispute with finality.
This theory of probabilities assumes that the factfinder in a
trial and, indeed, all rational human beings, naturally act in accor-
dance with the theory of probabilities in making their decisions.
The theory of knowledge and probabilities, however, is not univer-
sally accepted.' The idea that the theory of probability naturally
operates in human reason certainly is not self-executing in jury
room deliberations.
Jury instructions on burdens of proof are almost always vague
and ambiguous and thus confuse the very jurors they were in-
tended to guide. Judges, perhaps by design,9 explain only cursorily
the phrases that they use to convey the proper degree of certainty
to the jury. Professor Morgan notes the lack of clarity in the usual
jury instruction in a civil trial:
[The judge] ... explains that the preponderance of evidence does not signify
the greater number of witnesses or the larger volume of testimony but de-
notes, rather, evidence of greater convincing force. But he goes no farther. He
does not attempt to describe the state of mind of the jurors which the evi-
dence must create as he does in criminal cases. All his emphasis is upon the
7. J. MICHAEL & M. ADLER, THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROOF 49 (1931).
8. See infra notes 47-51 & 92 and accompanying texts. Professor Cohen suggests that
"popular probability" has nothing to do with statistical probability, but is a distinct phe-
nomenon not susceptible to precise quantification. Thus, legal proof is numerically inex-
pressible. L. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977).
9. See generally Broun & Kelly, Playing the Percentages and the Law of Evidence,
1970 U. ILL. L.F. 23 (demonstrating the utility of probability theory in trials and urging the
admission of probability statements into evidence under certain circumstances); Kaplan,
Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1968) (examining the
possible application of a mathematical decision theory to judicial decisionmaking).
Professor Tribe argues that quantifying burdens of proof, particularly "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt," diminishes the symbolic function of burdens of proof discussed in part III
of this Article. He hypothesizes that quantifying in jury instructions an acceptable risk of
error to which the trier of fact deliberately may subject the defendant, even though quantifi-
able doubt exists in reality, will result in the utilization of a lesser standard that jurors
otherwise should not apply. Tribe, A Further Critique of Mathematical Proof, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 1810, 1817 (1971); Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HARV. L. Rv. 1329, 1374-75 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Tribe, Trial by
Mathematics].
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means which call forth the state of mind.10
Further, the ordinary jury instruction on "clear and convincing ev-
idence" does not "describe the requisite degree [of belief], but em-
phasizes only the quantity and quality of the evidence necessary to
create the conviction."11 Professor Morgan concludes that these
ambiguities in standard jury instructions call for "a rephrasing
which will convey a clear and distinct idea to the average mind. 1 2
Similarly, Professor McBaine proposes to make jury instructions
on burdens of proof clearer by applying probabilities in simple
terms. "The only sound and defensible hypotheses are that the
trier, or triers, of facts can find what (a) probably has happened, or
(b) what highly probably has happened, or (c) what almost cer-
tainly has happened.""3
Opponents of the use of the probability theory for clarifying
jury instructions suggest that no language could convey to jurors
guidelines enabling them to know when they have reached their
decision with the degree of certainty required by the type of case
before them. Judge Frank in Larson v. Jo Ann Cab Corp.14 ex-
pressed doubts that human language is capable of conveying
proper guidelines to jurors. In Larson the trial judge made a long,
obscure charge to the jury on preponderance of the evidence dur-
ing which he spoke of "degree of conviction."1 5 The jury subse-
quently returned to ask whether they should apply the "beyond
the shadow of a doubt" standard." The trial judge did not explain
to the jury that the use of "conviction" in this context referred not
to a crime, but to the belief the jurors would reach during their
deliberations.17 On appeal, Judge Frank noted the inability of
humans to communicate effectively. 8 Metaphors, according to
Frank, are the general mode of speech and thought; no communi-
10. Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 HARv.
L. REv. 59, 64 (1933).
11. Id. at 66.
12. Id. at 67. A short time after Morgan called for new jury instructions, 681 jurors
responded to the question, "What propositions of law were most difficult to understand?"
Highest on the multiple choice list was "preponderance of evidence" (232 jurors). Trial by
Jury, 11 U. CN. L. Rzv. 119, 192 n.18, 195 (1937).
13. McBaine, Burdens of Proof, supra note 1, at 246-47 (emphasis in original) (citing
Morgan, supra note 10, at 66).
14. 209 F.2d 929 (1954).
15. Id. at 929.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 930.
18. Id. at 934.
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cation is possible without them.19 Probabilists, however, endow
metaphors such as "preponderance of the evidence" with reality
and utilize the analogy as a literal, comprehensive description of
reality.2 0 Judge Frank opined that effective metaphors "must be
neither too 'far fetched' nor too 'nearly fetched.' 'p21 Punning the
words "preponderance" and "imponderables," Judge Frank sug-
gested that because of the literal treatment of burdens of proof
metaphors, "preponderance" and "conviction" have little or no
meaning for modern jurors."2 Thus, he upheld the jury instruction
notwithstanding the trial judge's erroneous use of the term
"conviction."23
Given these barriers to human communication, Judge Frank,
like most opponents of the use of probability theory to simplify
jury instruction, suggested that clarification of jury instructions on
burdens of proof may be an impossible task. 4 He accepted the
proposition that judges should use the words best understood by
nonlawyers to revise jury charges, but expressed doubts that any
revisions actually would improve the jurors' understanding of bur-
dens of proof. To demonstrate the failures of human communica-
tion, Judge Frank enlisted the works of Alfred North Whitehead
and Charles Corbin: "There exist no methods which will 'infallibly
lead to one correct understanding' of another's words because in
'reading each other's words, men certainly see as through a glass,
darkly.' 25 Thus, Judge Frank responded to McBaine's proposed
jury instructions26 by stating that "[tihe suggestion may sound
promising; but apparently McBaine has not attempted to try out
these formulas on laymen. 1 7
Professor McBaine's suggestions have not been adopted, and
much opposition exists to using the language of probability theory
in jury instructions. Judge Frank, for example, while challenging
Professor McBaine to find clearer language and prove that the jury
understands it, suggested that we would be nostalgic for ambiguity
if Professor McBaine were to succeed.28 Too much precision in jury
19. Id. at 932.
20. Id. at 932-33.
21. Id. at 932 n.14 (quoting C. BROOKS & R. WARREN, MODERN RHETORic 426 (1949)).
22. 209 F.2d at 932 n.14, 933.
23. Id. at 935.
24. Id. at 934.
25. Id. at 934 (quoting C. CORBIN, 3 CoNTRAcTs § 535, at 16 (1960)).
26. See supra text accompanying note 13.
27. 209 F.2d at 934 n.25.
28. Id. at 934-35.
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charges would diminish the "resources of ambiguity" that I. A.
Richards wrote of.2" Indeed, fear of precision may be at the root of
much praise for the inscrutability of the jury. Likewise, some com-
mentators fear that using probability theory in jury instructions
may destroy the symbolism of the traditional burdens of proof.
30
The Larson jurors may have made an even more telling objec-
tion to Professor McBaine's formulations: judges would not read
Professor McBaine's charges in the (a) and (b) and (c) format
presented by McBaine. Even under Professor McBaine's approach,
the jurors would hear only (a) or (b) or (c), depending upon the
type of case before them. Yet if the Larson example is representa-
tive, the jurors want the judge to tell them the whole alphabet and
to say: "This is a regular civil suit exemplified by type (a), not a
criminal case represented by type (c)." Telling the jurors only one
letter of the alphabet fails to equip them with sufficient guidelines
to know what degree of belief to apply, however intuitive the
probability theory may be. The ambiguity, therefore, remains. This
fear of losing the richness of ambiguity renders the jury instruction
more a tool for appellate review than an actual guide to decision-
making for the jurors.
I1l. OmJEcTIVE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE OR SUBJECTIVE BELIEF?
Decisionmakers other than jurors decide pretrial and postrial
issues and conduct appellate review. In some instances these deci-
sionmakers apply the same burdens of proof-"preponderance of
the evidence," "clear and convincing evidence," and "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt"-that the trier of fact uses at trial as guidelines for
decisionmaking. In other instances these decisionmakers apply dif-
ferent burdens of proof, including "reasonable suspicion," "reason-
able (or probable) cause to believe," "substantial evidence," and
"clearly erroneous." The initial decisionmakers are law enforce-
ment officials in search and seizure and other areas governed by
constitutional considerations or administrative law judges and trial
judges in questions of review.
29. Id. at 935 n.31 (citing I. RICHARDS, How TO READ A PAGE 22 (1942); I. RICHARDS,
THE PHILOSOPHY OF RHErORIC 40, 72-73 (1936)).
30. See R. EGGLESTON, EVIDENCE, PROOF, AND PROBABILITY 102, 137 (1978); Bacigal,
The Fourth Amendment in Flux: The Rise and Fall of Probable Cause, 1979 U. ILL. L.F.
763, 806.
12991982]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
A. Preliminary Questions of Fact
In some pretrial issues, especially in constitutional or criminal
cases, the question arises whether the decisionmaker should use
the same burden of proof that a trier of fact would utilize at trial.
For example, in Lego v. Twomey31 the trial court admitted defen-
dant's confession into evidence after conducting a hearing outside
the jury's presence, at which defendant testified that the police
had coerced his confession, and the police officers testified that it
was voluntary.-" Defendant contended "that the trial judge should
have found the confession voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt
before admitting it into evidence."33 Utilizing only the three tradi-
tional trial standards, the Supreme Court urged sifting out consid-
eration of trial values at the pretrial stage, even when constitu-
tional rights are at stake and even when the case is a criminal case:
Nothing is to be gained from restating the constitutional rule as requiring
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of constitutionally ob-
tained evidence and then arguing that rights... are diluted unless admissi-
bility is governed by a high standard. Transparently, this assumes the ques-
tion at issue, which is whether a confession is admissible if found voluntary
by a preponderance of the evidence.3'
According to the Court, the "preponderance" standard sufficiently
addresses the reliability of a confession. "Petitioner offers nothing
to suggest that admissibility rulings have been unreliable or other-
wise wanting in quality because not based on some higher stan-
dard."3 5 Thus, Lego leads to the conclusion that the reliability of a
confession is the most important pretrial concern; constitutional
considerations allocating the risk of an incorrect decision operate
at the trial level.36
Judge Weinstein in United States v. Schipani 7 had a similar
occasion to analyze the three burdens of proof. In Schipani defen-
dant moved upon remand of the case by the Supreme Court s to
31. 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
32. Id. at 480.
33. Id. at 481. Illinois law provides that a confession challenged as involuntary can be
admitted into evidence if, at a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the judge finds it
voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence. See People v. Wagoner, 8 Ill. 2d 188, 133
N.E.2d 24 (1956).
34. 404 U.S. at 487 n.15.
35. Id. at 488.
36. For a criticism of Lego, see Saltzburg, Standards of Proof and Preliminary Ques-
tions of Fact, 27 STAN. L. Rav. 271, 277-80 (1975).
37. 289 F. Supp. 43 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 414 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 922 (1970).
38. 385 U.S. 372 (1966).
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suppress evidence allegedly obtained by the government as the re-
sult of a lead from an illegal wiretap. Judge Weinstein detailed the
facts proven from the available information and the information
obtained from the illegal taps. This information presented two
questions to the court. "First, whether individual items of evidence
used at the first trial were obtained, either directly or indirectly, as
a result of illegal monitoring. Second, whether the entire investiga-
tion of the defendant was tainted because its intensity was sub-
stantially affected by the electronic surveillance. 3 9 To these facts
Judge Weinstein applied the three burdens of proof and deter-
mined that the Government had the burden to prove "beyond a
reasonable doubt" that it had not obtained the evidence as a result
of illegal electronic surveillance; Judge Weinstein held that the
Government failed to meet that burden with certain evidence. 0
The Government, however, had to prove only by a "preponderance
of evidence" that the illegal leads did not affect substantially the
total investigation, and it sustained that burden.41 What is impor-
tant about Judge Weinstein's analysis for the concept of burdens
of proof is that he, as a decisionmaker, discusses all three burdens
of proof and articulates his own level of conviction. At the same
time, Judge Weinstein attempted to articulate the policy or value
conveyed by each burden-as opposed to the clarity of what the
standard requires.42 This need to select a standard that conveys
constitutional values in the allocation of the risk of an incorrect
decision presents the most difficulty to decisionmakers.
Implicit in Judge Weinstein's analysis is the proposition that
the burdens of proof are clearly definable, at least on a compara-
tive basis. Judge Weinstein demonstrated the clear operation of
the burdens themselves through two hypotheticals in which he de-
fined burdens of proof in terms of percentages.43 "Preponderance
of the evidence" is perhaps the easiest burden to translate into
percentages because the terminology itself suggests that it is some-
thing just over fifty percent. Defining other burdens in terms of
percentages, however, is considerably more difficult. "Beyond a
reasonable doubt," for example, must be something over ninety
percent, although agreement on a particular figure will be rare.44
39. United States v. Schipani, 289 F. Supp. at 45.
40. Id. at 59.
41. Id. at 64-65.
42. Id. at 54-59.
43. Id. at 57.
44. Judge Weinstein in Schipani, for example, utilized 95+ % for "beyond a reasona-
13011982]
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Nonetheless, defining burdens of proof in terms of the probability
theory and degrees of belief suggests that percentage definitions
should attach to each burden and that the burdens lie along a con-
tinuum.45 Indeed, Glanville Williams finds greater protection in
such numerical quantification of risks than in the "gut reaction" of
jurors.'6
The desire to make the comparison of probabilities more pre-
cise by fitting the various burdens into a continuum or scale of
percentages, however, has not received universal assent. One com-
mentator, relying on the works of A.J. Ayer,'7 recognizes "state-
ments of credibility" as one type of probability.'8 Ayer's "state-
ment of credibility" is not a subjective belief but "the degree of
credence which a rational man will give to something based on the
evidence available to him." 49 While avowing that "there is nothing
wrong in principle in the court attempting to quantify numerically
the degree of probability to be reached before any doubt can be
called unreasonable," the commentator, echoing Professor Tribe's
description of "beyond a reasonable doubt" as a "fuzzy" term,50
criticizes the quantification of burdens of proof:
Of course the law could determine a numerical quantification on the level
of doubt which is permissible. But the point is that the law does not do this.
It leaves the standard of satisfaction required vague. It requires a credibility
statement that the facts in issue occurred beyond reasonable doubt and not a
statistical statement that the probability of the facts in issue is 0.99 or 0.999
and so on.5'
ble doubt." Id. at 57.
45. Beneath the legal concept of probability lies the mathematical theory of
probability. Only occasionally does this break surface-apart from the concept of proof
on a balance of probabilities, which can be restated as the burden of showing odds of at
least 51 to 49 that such-and-such has taken place or will do so.
Davies v. Taylor, 1974 A.C. 207, 219 (Lord Simon of Glaisdale). This statement comports
with Blaise Pascal's principles of probability. See B. PASCAL, PENSEsM (1670). Subjective
probability requiring actual belief that the fact in dispute exists is an alternative to the
Pascalian "more probable than not" formulation. The classic case requiring actual belief by
the jury is Sargent v. Massachusetts Accident Co., 307 Mass. 246, 29 N.E.2d 825 (1940). For
a more detailed description of subjective probability, see . EGGLESTON, supra note 30, at
109-11 (1978).
46. Williams, The Mathematics of Proof, 1979 CRIM. L. REy. 297, 340, 353.
47. See A. AYER, THE CENrTRAL QUESTIONS O PHILOSOPHY 163-74 (1973); A. AYER,
PROBABILITY AND EVIDENCE Part 1, Chs. 2-3 (1972); B. RUSSELL, HUMAN KNOWLEDGE: ITS
SCOPE AND LIMITS 356-61 (1948).
48. Jackson, Probability and Mathematics in Court Fact-Finding, 31 N. h. LEGAL Q.
239, 241 (1980).
49. Id. at 242.
50. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics, supra note 9, at 1375.
51. Jackson, supra note 48, at 253.
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Because of the inability-and reluctance-to agree on the
meaning of the various burdens of proof, judges continue to apply
different burdens of proof even to preliminary questions of fact
concerning constitutional claims. For example, defendant in
United States v. Thevis5 2 claimed that the Government had de-
prived him of his constitutional right to confront the witnesses
against him. Judge Murphy examined the evidence proffered by
the government to show that defendant had deprived the witness
of his civil right to testify against defendant by murdering that
witness and, therefore, had waived his constitutional right.53 Like
Judge Weinstein, Judge Murphy reviewed all three burdens of
proof to determine which burden of proof should apply to defen-
dant's constitutional claims and whether he waived those claims.
Noting the Lego standard of "preponderance of the evidence,"
Judge Murphy nevertheless utilized the "clear and convincing evi-
dence" standard to honor the importance of the constitutional
right to confront adverse witnesses."
B. Probable Cause
"Preponderance of the evidence," when described in terms of
percentages, is set at fifty percent to indicate that a quantum over
fifty percent constitutes a preponderance. The verbal definition of
"preponderance" is "more probable than not."5  Rightly or
wrongly, commentators and judges have used these same defini-
tions on occasion to define "probable cause" in determining the
legality of searches and seizures under the fourth amendment.56
52. 84 F.R.D. 57 (N.D. Ga. 1979), aff'd, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982).
53. Id. at 71.
54. Judge Murphy utilized the standard established in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 464 (1938) for deciding whether an individual had knowingly waived one of his consti-
tutional rights. He then concluded:
In summary, the Court finds clear and convincing evidence that defendant Thevis
was aware that Roger Underhill would be a witness in the then-pending trial of this
case. To prevent this testimony, defendant Thevis and others including defendants
Hood and Evans conspired to murder Underhill, and on October 25, 1978, the objective
of the conspiracy was successfully attained.
The Court holds as a matter of law that the declarant is unavailable because of
defendant Thevis' actions, and as a result of those actions, defendant Thevis waived
his right to confrontation.
84 F.R.D. at 73.
55. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 794 (2d ed. 1972).
56. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Be-
yond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 40, 73 (1968). Professor LaFave, however, notes that the definition
in percentage terms "is still open." 1 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT 478 (1978).
1982] 1303
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This Article treats "probable cause" to obtain a search or arrest
warrant or to search or arrest without a warrant as a burden of
proof. Like the burdens already discussed, "probable cause" is a
guideline denoting when the decisionmaker in question has
reached the required certainty for the type of decision at hand.57
The Supreme Court set forth the modern definition of "proba-
ble cause" for fourth amendment purposes in Carroll v. United
States." The Court defined "probable cause" as "a belief, reasona-
bly arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer." 59 Ac-
cording to the Court, "probable cause" and "reasonable cause" are
equivalent.6 0 Subsequently, the Court expounded upon this defini-
tion in Brinegar v. United States. 1 Justice Rutledge, writing for
57. Other commentators have treated probable cause as a point on the same scale as
the trial burdens. E. IMWINKELRIED, P. GIANNELLI, F. GILLIGAN, & F. LEDERER, CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE 215 (1979) [hereinafter cited as E. IMWINKELRIED] ("Although 'probable cause'
means more than mere suspicion, it does not require proof sufficient to establish guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt ... ."); Armentano, The Standards for Probable Cause Under
the Fourth Amendment, 44 CONN. BAR J. 137, 144 (1970) ("Probable cause lies somewhere
between reasonable suspicion and proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."); Professor
Bacigal observes,
The possible range from which the required level of certainty emerges is a mathemati-
cal scale from zero to one hundred percent. The Supreme Court, however, has refrained
from expressing the required level of certainty in mathematical terms, relying instead
on a scale of less exact but more familiar legal terminology.
Bacigal, supra note 30, at 771.
58. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Earlier analyses of probable clause arose in the context of
statutory rather than constitutional construction. The Court in Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642
(1878), which arose under the Collection Act of March 2, 1799, 1 Stat. 696 § 89, defined
probable cause as the "facts and circumstances before the officer. . . to warrant a man of
prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been committed." Id. at 645. After
citing case authority for its definition of probable cause, the Court noted that the statute
used the term "reasonable cause." The importance of Stacey is the Court's equating of the
two phrases: "No argument is made that there is a substantial difference in the meaning of
these expressions, and we think there is none. If there was a probable cause of seizure, there
was a reasonable cause. If there was a reasonable cause of seizure, there was a probable
cause. In many of these reported cases the two expressions are used as meaning the same
thing." Id. at 646 (citations omitted). Not only do the cases equate reasonable and probable
cause to believe, but they treat "a reasonable ground of suspicion" and "an honest and
strong suspicion" as probable cause or belief. Id. at 645. Similarly, the Court in Locke v.
United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339 (1813), equated probable cause for seizure to "circum-
stances which warrant suspicion." Id. at 348. The Carroll Court relied on both Stacey and
Locke. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. at 155, 161.
59. 267 U.S. at 149.
60. Id. at 155-56.
61. 338 U.S. 160 (1949). Both Carroll and Brinegar concerned the search of
automobiles operated on public highways. In both cases federal officers enforcing federal
liquor statutes had recognized the drivers and cars from prior involvement in illegal liquor
transactions and searched the vehicles without a warrant. The Brinegar Court noted that
Carroll "on its face most closely approximates the situation presented here" and that "the
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the Court, emphasized the "large difference" between proof of guilt
in a criminal case and "probable cause" for arrest or search."2 He
observed that the application of the "guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard to the situations governed by "probable cause"
would curtail severely law enforcement activities.6 3  "Probable
cause" is simply a guide for routine law enforcement investiga-
tions, not all of which will lead to a criminal trial.6 4
In dealing with probable cause .... as the very name implies, we deal
with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not
legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what
must be proved. 5
The Court noted the distinctions between the formal and deliber-
ate nature of prbof at trial and the instantaneous decisionmaking
by law enforcement officers on the streets."6 The constitutional re-
quirements of reasonableness in situations governed by "probable
cause"$ are "a practical, nontechnical conception. '8 7
In effect, the Court in Brinegar indicated that the real choice
of standards governing law enforcement investigations is not the
choice between "reasonable doubt" and "probable cause" but that
between "probable cause" and "suspicion." Although the Court did
not state that law enforcement officials can operate under a consti-
tutional standard of "suspicion," it suggested that "probable
cause" shades off into "suspicion" and that the two standards exist
along a continuum:68
basic facts held to constitute probable cause in the Carroll case were very similar to the
basic facts here." Id. at 164, 165.
62. "There is a large difference between the two things to be proved, as well as be-
tween the tribunals which determine them, and therefore a like difference in the quanta and
modes of proof required to establish them." Id. at 173.
63. Id. at 174.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 175. The Court described the standard of proof as less than "conviction" but
"more than bare suspicion." Id. The Court's reference to probability as reflected in the word
"probable" points to the common origin of both words from the word "proof"--"probo". See
the definition of "probable" in 8 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1400 (1970).
66. 338 U.S. at 176.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 177. The Court in Brinegar stated that the Carroll facts "lay on the border
between suspicion and probable cause." Id. The Court also quoted the definition of probable
cause utilized in Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813): ["Probable
cause] imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion." 338 U.S. at
175 n.14. Without suggesting anything about the role of suspicion as a burden of proof at
the time that Locke was decided, the Court noted that probable cause presently means more
than suspicion. Id. at 175. In Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) the dissent
quoted from one of John Wilkes' 1777 parliamentary speeches: "There is not a syllable in
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The troublesome line posed by the facts in the Carroll case and in this
case is one between mere suspicion and probable cause. That line necessarily
must be drawn by an act of judgment formed in the light of the particular
situation and with account taken of all the circumstances."
Thus, the Court in Brinegar fixes "probable cause" on a contin-
uum between "suspicion" and "reasonable doubt." "Probable
cause," therefore, is like the trial burdens of proof and may be ana-
lyzed in accordance with the theory of probability as it applies to
Ayer's "credible statements. '7 0
The questions of whether "reasonable" and "probable cause"
are equivalent and whether "probable cause" should be defined as
"more probable than not," however, have perplexed courts and
commentators for decades.7 1 The Supreme Court in Brinegar re-
tained the Carroll Court's equation of "reasonable" and "probable
cause,"72 but the confusion nonetheless continues. The Commen-
tary accompanying the arrest provisions in the Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure (Code), for example, distinguishes "reason-
able" and "probable cause. '7 3 The Code states that the "standard
of belief necessary for an arrest" and for a search is "reasonable
cause."7 4 It does not use "probable cause" since the reporters
wished to avoid the connotation between arrest and search stan-
dards and the probabilistic definition of "more probable (likely)
than not" or "preponderance of the evidence. '7 5 In other words,
while "reasonable cause" (or "probable cause") must be less than
fifty percent certainty, the reporters concluded that any more pre-
cise definition in terms of percentages would be inappropriate.7 6
Similarly, the First Circuit's decision in United States v. Mel-
vin7 illustrates the disagreement of courts about the relationship
between "reasonable" and "probable cause." The court in uphold-
ing the validity of a search warrant equated "probable cause" and
the Bill of the degree of probability attending the suspicion." Id. at 316 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
69. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. at 176.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 47-51.
71. For example, Professor LaFave presents four categories of situations in which he
argues that "it must be determined just how probable the probable cause must be." 1 W.
LAFAvE, supra note 56, at 479-93.
72. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. at 175-76.
73. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 120.1 & comment 4, § 210.1 &
comment 7. (Proposed Official Draft 1975).
74. Id. § 120.1 comment 4.
75. Id. § 120.1 comment 4, § 210.1 comment 7.
76. Id. § 120.1 comment 4.
77. 596 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1979).
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"reasonable cause":
First, appellant reads the phrase "probable cause" with emphasis on the word
"probable" and would define it mathematically to mean "more likely than
not" or "by a preponderance of the evidence." This reading is incorrect. The
phrase is less stringent than tfiat-the words "reasonable cause" are perhaps
closer to what is meant. The Supreme Court has asserted that "'reasonable-
ness' is the overriding test of compliance with the Fourth Amendment,"...
has approvingly quoted authority equating "probable cause" with "reasona-
ble grounds to believe," . . . and has even used the phrases "reasonable
cause" and "probable cause" interchangeably .... 78
On the other hand, Judge Bownes, in dissent, seemed to define
"probable cause" as more than fifty percent certainty:
The majority states that probable cause is properly defined as reasonable
cause. . . .The majority, by focusing narrowly on language relating to "rea-
sonableness" compels the inference that the degree of probity required for
probable cause to obtain a search warrant is somehow of a lesser calibre than
other forms of probable cause. This is patently incorrect. Probable cause for a
search warrant requires the same degree of certitude as probable cause to
arrest.. .. While that degree need not be calibrated according to mathemat-
ical formula, the strong showing which must be made cannot be ignored7
As the Commentary to the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Proce-
dure points out, however, even cases suggesting a "more probable
than not" definition of "probable cause" do not apply the standard
literally:
[T]here appear to be no cases in which it [a more-probable-than-not
standard] has been actually applied-e.g., when the evidence showed a 33
1/3 % chance that contraband would be found in a given place, and the appli-
cation for a warrant was rejected because the degree of probability was less
than 50%. 80
The various standards of probable cause, therefore, present
considerable confusion. Some commentators argue that since an of-
ficer must demonstrate "probable cause" to obtain a warrant,
courts should not apply a lesser standard for the officer acting
without a warrant.81 To encourage the use of warrants, some have
suggested the converse of this proposition: the standard for ob-
taining a warrant should be less stringent than for police action
without a warrant.8 2 That confusing concept which Judge Bownes
78. Id. at 495 (citations omitted).
79. Id. at 505-06 (Bownes, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
80. MODEL CODE OF PEE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, supra note 73, § 210.2 comment.
81. See, e.g., Player, Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 5 GA. L. Rav. 269, 273
(1971).
82. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964) ("Thus, when a search is based upon a
magistrate's, rather than a police officer's determination of probable cause, the reviewing
courts will accept evidence of a less 'judicially competent or persuasive character than would
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rejects apparently rests upon Justice Robert Jackson's point that
magistrates will make the "usual inferences which reasonable men
draw from evidence," thus rendering police action that has re-
ceived prior approval by a neutral magistrate less vulnerable to
later challenge.8 3
A related controversy is the debate over whether "probable
cause" is objective or subjective and who should make the "proba-
ble cause" determination. While the Carroll test utilizes the objec-
tive, or reasonable, standard, one commentator has suggested that
"courts are split over whether the probable cause test is an objec-
tive or objective-subjective test."'" The Carroll Court defined
"probable cause" as a "belief reasonably arising out of the circum-
stances known to the seizing officer" and noted that good faith is
not enough to constitute "probable cause." 5 "That faith must be
grounded on facts. . . which in the judgment of the court would
make his faith reasonable."8 Further, Justice Marshall in United
States v. Watson8 7 noted that when "the good faith of the arrest-
ing officers is not at issue," courts use an objective measure of
"probable cause."8 8 Another commentator, while apparently ac-
cepting the objective approach, finds the objective-subjective dis-
tinction irrelevant in light of the more important constitutional
question of who determines "probable cause."8
[A] reasonable man's conclusion that it is appropriate to search, based on
a fifty-one percent likelihood of finding seizable items, does not guarantee
that the search was constitutionally permissible under the reasonableness
clause of the fourth amendment .... If the reasonable man's conclusion was
the test for the constitutionality of an intrusion, fourth amendment issues
could be taken from the courts and decided by juries or public opinion
surveys .... Thus, application of the traditional probable cause approach re-
quires a distinction between the reasonable belief standard-determined by
the Constitution-and the degree of certainty that the authorities actually
had-determined by the reasonable man standard.90
have justified an officer in acting on his own without a warrant,'....
83. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
84. E. IMWINKELREID, supra note 57, at 216. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964);
Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958). The objective test reviews the informa-
tion the officer had and determines if "that information amounts to probable cause." The
subjective test adds a third requirement that the officer subjectively believed he had proba-
ble cause. E. IMWINKELREID, supra note 57, at 216.
85. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149, 161 (1925).
86. Id. at 161-62 (quoting Director General v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25, 28 (1923)).
87. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
88. Id. at 435 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
89. Bacigal, supra note 30, at 772.
90. Id.
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The "probable cause" determination, unlike the trial burdens
and decisions of preliminary questions of fact, has two levels of
decisionmaking: (1) the law enforcement officer who believes that
he has "probable cause" to. obtain a warrant or who in the absence
of a warrant must show "probable cause" at a preliminary hearing
or suppression hearing; and (2) the magistrate who issues or de-
clines to issue the warrant and the judge who applies constitutional
requirements to determine whether the officer had "probable
cause." Judicial oversight of law officials' conduct, however, does
not render the need for clarity of the standards any less acute since
the officer makes the initial "probable cause" determination.9 1 Nor
does judicial oversight of "probable cause" determinations make
them significantly different from a jury's decision at trial. Jurors
decide guilt or innocence in accordance with the "beyond a reason-
able doubt" standard. Probability theory analysis, therefore, is
equally applicable to decisions made by magistrates, juries, and re-
viewing courts.92 The difference between "probable cause" and the
burdens of proof previously examined is simply the interposition of
a neutral decisionmaker-the magistrate or reviewing court-
between the law enforcement officer and the person searched or
seized. Thus, "probable cause" shares some characteristics with ap-
pellate review standards.
C. Reasonable Suspicion
"Reasonable suspicion" applies to less intrusive searches and
seizures, such as stop-and-frisk searches. A showing of "reasonable
suspicion" traditionally has required less certainty than "probable
cause," only "some appreciable probability of danger created by
someone with a weapon"93 that was "necessarily almost unreflec-
tive and reflexive."'s4 The term "reasonable suspicion," however, is
91. Professor Bacigal agrees: "[t]he less than forthright manner in which the Court
has discussed the methodology used to identify 'reasonable belief' is cause for objection." Id.
at 771.
92. Professors Broun and Kelly refer to probabilistic analysis of decisionmaking:
Through proper statistical sampling, the probability of the occurrence of historical
events can indeed be established within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty.
Through statistical decision theory, based on the laws of probability, decisions made by
businesses, governments, individuals and even judges and juries can be analyzed and
evaluated in helpful mathematical terms.
Broun & Kelly, supra note 9, at 26.
93. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1093 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
94. Id. at 1095.
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"an objective standard, somewhat less exigent than the arrest stan-
dard. ' 95 Even if "suspicion" appears to suggest a subjective stan-
dard,"' the emphasis is on the reasonableness of the suspicion.
Thus, "reasonable suspicion" represents simply a lower standard
than "probable cause.197 The Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio"s
subjected the police stop-and-frisk action to the "reasonable suspi-
cion" standard and concluded that the patdown complies with the
reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment if the officer
had "reasonable suspicion." The "reasonable suspicion" standard
is satisfied if the officer observes "unusual conduct which leads
him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing
may be armed and presently dangerous...."9
"Reasonable suspicion" raises in a more pronounced form is-
sues suggested by "probable cause." Judge Weinstein in United
States v. Lopez 00 placed "reasonable suspicion" in the broad spec-
trum of burdens of proof:
Implied in terms such as "probable cause" or "reasonableness" is a con-
tinuum of probability that the subject has been, is, or is about to be, engaged
in criminal activity; it begins with no evidence of such conduct and extends
to almost certainty. Ranked along this continuum are various degrees of
probability justifying different types of intrusion upon the privacy of the
individual....
95. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, supra note 73, § 110.2 comment 6.
Part of the difficulty in developing a rule for frisks is that the policeman, assuming
his good faith, will be acting on a subjective standard-his own immediate sense of risk
to himself-while the court testing his action for purposes of admissibility will be act-
ing on an objective standard-what a reasonably prudent policeman in his position
would do after weighing the risks of harm from possible hidden weapons presented by
the particular known circumstances against our society's aversion to physical intrusions
on the person of a free man.
United States v. Lopez, 375 F. Supp. 1077, 1095 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (citations omitted).
96. Criticism of the "reasonable suspicion" standard frequently rests on the concern
that "temporary seizures for investigation will be undertaken upon the subjective judgment
of police officers and that courts will be reluctant to second-guess them." LaFave, supra
note 56, at 70.
97. For purposes of the fourth amendment, the important constitutional considera-
tion is the distinction between "mere" suspicion and "reasonable" suspicion, or be-
tween "mere" belief, and "reasonable" belief. The concept of reasonableness is the sig-
nificant legal determination; references to belief, suspicion and justification are
surplusage. In fact, careful scrutiny of the Supreme Court's usage of the relevant terms
reveals mere belief is no better than mere suspicion, while in some situations reasona-
ble suspicion is every bit as good as reasonable belief.
Bacigal, supra note 30, at 781 (footnotes omitted).
98. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
99. Id. at 30.
100. 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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An investigative "stop" requires one degree of probability, while a "frisk"
in many cases requires a higher level. At other points on the scale are levels
of probability justifying the various exigent circumstance intrusions typified
by border searches, automobile searches, those occasioned by hot pursuit and
the like. Finally, at the practical end of the continuum we find the classic
"probable cause" levels which ivill justify the issuance of search warrants, and
searches incidental to arrest with or without a warrant.101
This view of the scale of burdens of proof has gained wide accept-
ance and has helped the Supreme Court clarify "reasonable
suspicion."
Three recent Supreme Court cases show the increased clarity
of "reasonable suspicion." First, in Ybarra v. Illinoisl0s the Court
held that a law enforcement officer's suspicion must relate specifi-
cally to the suspect he wishes to search. The officers in Ybarra had
a warrant to search a tavern. Once inside the tavern, they searched
all customers and discovered illegal drugs on defendant's person.
In holding the search unconstitutional, the Court explained that
the grounds for a constitutional frisk would'have had to include
defendant's connection to the tavern and some individualized basis
for suspecting that defendant was armed or in possession of drugs:
Nothing in Terry can be understood to allow a generalized "cursory
search for weapons" or, indeed, any search whatever for anything but weap-
ons. The "narrow scope" of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for
weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to
be frisked .... 110
Ybarra equates belief and suspicion and requires that suspicion at-
tach to the person to be searched. Thus, "unreflective and reflexive
police behavior is not sufficient to give rise to reasonable
suspicion."'"
Similarly, the Court in Michigan v. Summersos focused on
"the nature of the 'articulable facts' supporting the detention,"""
and stated:
It is also appropriate to consider the nature of the articulable and indi-
vidualized suspicion on which the police base the detention of the occupant
of a home subject to a search warrant .... The connection of an occupant to
101. Id. at 1094 (citations omitted).
102. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
103. Id. at 93-94.
104. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. at 1095. See United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) for an earlier definition requiring reasonable suspicion to be
particularized: "[W]hen an officer's observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a par-
ticular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, he may stop the car
briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion." Id. at 881.
105. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
106. Id. at 702.
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that home gives the police officer an easily identifiable and certain basis for
determining that suspicion of criminal activity justifies a detention of that
occupant.'
Requiring that the police officer set forth the particular facts that
gave rise to his suspicion makes the "reasonable suspicion" stan-
dard less vague.108 The Court, however, has not attempted to de-
fine "reasonable suspicion" in terms of percentages or even in com-
parative terms with "probable cause."
Finally, in United States v. Cortez 09 the Court suggested that
a totality of the circumstances approach leads to an objective and
particularized basis for suspicion:
Courts have used a variety -of terms to capture the elusive concept of
what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop a person. Terms like "ar-
ticulable reasons" and "founded suspicion" are not self-defining; they fall
short of providing clear guidance dispositive of the myriad factual situations
that arise....
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities.
Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people
formulated certain commonsense conclusions about human behavior; jurors
as factfinders are permitted to do the same-and so are law enforcement of-
ficers. Finally, the evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in
terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the
field of law enforcement.
[T]he process just described must raise a suspicion that the particular
individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.110
This definition of "reasonable suspicion" places suspicion in the
context of the practical theory of probabilities and recognizes that
law enforcement officers and jurors alike are capable of making de-
cisions that can be analyzed in terms of probabilities. Moreover,
this definition treats reason, suspicion, and cause as equivalents or
as points on the same scale or continuum. Thus, Cortez represents
a serious attempt to clarify the previously vague definition of "rea-
sonable suspicion," which now requires more studied action than
107. Id. at 703.
108. For summary of criticism on the vagueness of the reasonable suspicion standard,
see LaFave, supra note 56, at 68 n.137.
109. 449 U.S. 411 (1981). Other fourth amendment issues requiring application of a
particular burden of proof include border and administrative searches. See United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) ("[W]hen an officer's observations lead him rea-
sonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the coun-
try, he may stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion.");
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 268 (1973) (probable cause is required for
the search); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538-39 (1967) (lesser standard of
probable cause applies to health and housing inspections than to ordinary criminal cases).
110. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18.
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the "unreflective and reflexive" reaction to danger.111 Rather than
clarifying the degree of certainty required by "reasonable suspi-
cion" relative to "probable cause," however, the Court emphasizes
the factual basis for "reasonable suspicion." The question remains,
therefore, whether "reasonable suspicion" is equvalent to "proba-
ble cause" or whether it is less stringent.
D. Posttrial Considerations and Appellate Review
The role of burdens of proof as a guide to decisionmaking in
posttrial proceedings is much less clear than in the pretrial and
trial phases of the legal process. Indeed, some justification exists
for treating posttrial matters differently from preliminary ques-
tions of fact since admissibility issues resolved before trial still
leave credibility to be determined by the factfinder. On the other
hand, posttrial matters often may involve issues not determined at
all by the trial. The purpose of this section, therefore, is not to
advocate only one standard of proof for decisionmaking at the
posttrial stage, but simply to demonstrate the appropriateness of
considering burdens of proof in the resolution of posttrial issues.
The theories of burdens of proof may aid such posttrial decisions
as presentence hearings, parole and probation revocation hearings,
and declarations of mistrial for manifest necessity. Although this
Article does not catalogue all areas of judicial decisionmaking that
burdens of proof may measure, the exploration of this emerging
area to which burdens of proof will find greater application is ben-
eficial.11 Similarly, the Article examines briefly the standards of
the appeal process itself in terms of their operation as a descrip-
tion of the appellate decisionmaker's conviction about trial errors.
111. See supra text accompanying note 94.
112. The list is suggestive rather than exhaustive because one purpose of this Article is
to show the applicability of burdens of proof to prevent endless proliferation of new termi-
nology when the standard of proof in two different types of situations is the same. For
example, section C does not discuss strip and body cavity searches, although the Supreme
Court arguably has established a "clear indication" burden of proof for blood samples and
body cavity searches. See United States v. Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966). More-
over, the Ninth Circuit has held that "mere chance" is not enough for a narcotics body
cavity search: "There must exist facts creating a clear indication, or plain suggestion, of
smuggling. Nor need these facts reach the dignity of the equivalent of 'probable cause
.... '" Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945
(1967). Is this simply a reasonable suspicion standard? In United States v. Clymore, 515 F.
Supp. 1361 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) the court held that strip searches and medical body cavity
searches are "governed by different standards"-reasonable suspicion governs the strip
search and "probable cause" governs the body cavity search. Id. at 1366-68.
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1. Parole and Probation Revocation Hearings
The Supreme Court has not set specifically a burden of proof
requirement for parole and probation revocation hearings. The
Court in Morrissey v. Brewer " held that a parolee is entitled to
preliminary and final revocation hearings, but it did not specify
the burden of proof required in the final hearing. To hold the pa-
rolee for a final hearing, officials must demonstrate "probable
cause"; for final revocation officials must find "more than" "proba-
ble cause. ' ' 1 4 Similarly, a probationer in United States v. Smith "
challenged the "reasonably satisfied" standard used to determine
whether he had violated his probation conditions and argued that
"preponderance of the evidence" was the proper standard. The
Seventh Circuit cited Morrissey for the proposition that due pro-
cess requires no more than "reasonable satisfaction" and con-
cluded that defendant had violated his probation.116 The court,
however, did not explain how much less certainty "reasonable sat-
isfaction" requires than does "preponderance of the evidence."
Moreover, the court did not relate "satisfaction" to "probable
cause."
2. Presentence Hearings
The exploration of due process requirements at sentencing has
focused upon the burden of proof required at a presentence hear-
ing. The Second Circuit in Hollis v. Smith117 applied the protec-
tions of due process to a repealed New York statute permitting
indeterminate sentencing.118 The court held that only proof of the
fact which triggers the sentencing provision by "clear, unequivocal
and convincing evidence" may trigger the sentencing provision be-
cause of the seriousness of the values at stake in indeterminate
113. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
114. Id. at 487-88.
115. 571 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1978).
116. Id. The court also cited Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789-90 n.12 (1973) and
cases from the various circuits deriving "reasonable satisfaction" as the appropriate burden
of proof in the absence of the Supreme Court's imposition of a standard.
117. 571 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1978).
118. At that time § 243 of the New York Penal Code provided:
[A]ny person convicted of assault upon another with intent to commit the felony of
rape in the first degree, rape in the second degree, sodomy in the first degree, sodomy
in the second degree or carnal abuse may be punished by imprisonment for an indefi-
nite term the minimum of which shall be one day and the maximum of which shall be
the duration of his natural life.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 243 (McKinney 1950) (repealed).
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sentencing. 119 The provision for enhanced sentencing in United
States v. Fatico"' 0 gave rise to similar due process considerations.
Defendant's membership in an organized crime family triggered
the enhanced sentencing provision, although this alleged member-
ship was not relevant at trial. In recognition of the values consid-
ered in Hollis, Judge Weinstein selected the "clear, unequivocal,
and convincing evidence" standard."'
3. Manifest Necessity
The fifth amendment double jeopardy protection bars rep-
rosecution after the court declares a mistrial unless the trial was
ended because of "manifest necessity."'' 22 Courts arguably could
analyze the decision to declare a mistrial for manifest necessity in
accordance with burden of proof theory. In United States v. Mas-
trangelo'2' the trial court declared a mistrial after the murder of a
prosecution witness. Defendant argued that the court could not
find manifest necessity "without an actual showing of the defen-
dant's complicity in the death of the witness."'' 24 The Second Cir-
cuit chose not to analyze the facts from the perspective of burdens
of proof:
It is simply impracticable in the situation of the killing of a key witness to
reach any well-founded determination about the true course of events in an
hour, a day, a week, or even a month.
The test, therefore, is not whether the defendant was in fact involved in
the witness's death, nor even whether under a preponderance of the evidence
or some lesser evidentiary standard the court finds it probable that the de-
fendant has participated in the murder.... Rather, the test must be simply
whether at the time the trial judge is faced with the question he reasonably
concludes that there is a distinct possibility that the defendant participated
in making the witness unavailable .... 12
In choosing this lesser standard the court in effect utilized a stan-
dard similar to the "reasonable suspicion" standard of a decade
ago: the "unreflective and reflexive action" of the law enforcement
officer faced with danger. 26 The dissent argued that the "heavy
119. The court derived this standard from Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization
Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966).
120. 458 F. Supp. 388 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
121. Id. at 408.
122. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824); see Note, Double
Jeopardy: The Reprosecution Problem, 77 HARv. L. Rxv. 1272, 1276-81 (1964).
123. 662 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1981).
124. Id. at 951.
125. Id. at 951-52 (emphasis added).
126. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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government burden" of manifest necessity is an independent bur-
den of proof and charged the majority with ignoring "the heavy
burden and 'high degree' standards enunciated" by the Supreme
Court.127 According to the dissent, the majority's holding was "a
tortured analysis of the standard of proof."12 8 If more cases arise in
this context, the applicability of burdens of proof to a finding of
manifest necessity will receive fuller treatment and perhaps raise
the standard of proof required.129
4. Appellate Review
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for appellate re-
view of the factual findings as follows: "Findings of fact [by the
court without a jury] shall not be set aside unless clearly errone-
ous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.""" Despite the
seeming clarity of the rule, dispute over the scope of appellate re-
view is widespread.131 The Supreme Court in United States v.
United Gypsum Co.1 3 2 defined "clearly erroneous": "A finding is
'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it,
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. '13 3 This
description, which focuses on "the definite and firm conviction" of
the reveiwing court, permits analysis as a burden of proof. Just as
the factfinder at trial must have the required degree of conviction
to reach a decision, the appellate court must have an established
degree of conviction to reverse the trial court. Although the Su-
preme Court has not articulated a definition of "clearly erroneous"
with specificity, the Court's language describing the clearly errone-
ous standard is like the language used to define other burdens of
127. 662 F.2d at 953-54.
128. Id. at 954. The dissent suggested that the reason the majority used the "distinct
possibility" standard had to do with the problems of presenting evidence against more than
one defendant under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
129. Now that the court has gotten its eighteen feet wet in the murky waters of stop
and frisk, there is ample reason to anticipate further classification of the grounds for
stopping .... Terry is not the end; it is the beginning, and more specific limits will
later emerge by a process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.
LaFave, supra note 56, at 70, 73.
130. Fan. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
131. Cf. Royal Business Machines, Inc. v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34 (7th Cir. 1980);
William B. Tanner Co. v. WIO0, Inc., 528 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Hunt,
513 F.2d 129 (10th Cir. 1975).
132. 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
133. Id. at 395.
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proof.14 Judge Nangle finds the Gypsum definition unsatisfactory
because it only "muddle[s] an already elusive standard."135 The
Gypsum forumulation has not
truly captured the essence of the Rule. . . . Being convinced that a view is
erroneous . . . is not the same as being convinced that a view is clearly erro-
neous. . . . Whether the requirement that the appellate court be "definitely
and firmly" convinced of the correctness of its choice actually provides a solu-
tion for this problem is questionable.3
6
Judge Nangle is concerned with the choice of the wider scope of
review permitted by the "clearly erroneous" standard.137 Commen-
tators and judges alike have criticized variations by the courts of
appeals on the Supreme Court's consistent application of the
"clearly erroneous" standard.138
Courts also have confused at times the "clearly erroneous"
rule with the "substantial evidence" test used for review of agency
findings. This confusion arises from the attempt to restate the rule
for appellate review.139 The Supreme Court clearly defined "sub-
stantial evidence" as "more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. 1 4 0 Substantial evidence "must do more
than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be estab-
lished. . . . [i]t must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a
jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be
drawn from it is one of fact for the jury. '1 4' The wording of this
134. R. ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL PROcEss 691 (1976).
135. Nangle, The Ever Widening Scope of Fact Review in Federal Appellate
Courts-Is the "Clearly Erroneous Rule" Being Avoided?, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 409, 416 (1981).
136. Id.
137. See Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and
Rules, 3 VAND. L. REv. 493, 505 (1950).
138. The Supreme Court has applied consistently the Gypsum definition. See Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74 n.19 (1978). For an early
study of the departures from the intent of FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a), see Clark, supra note 137,
at 505-06.
139. "[C]ourts of review would add more light to the standard of 'clearly erroneous' by
avoiding [concurrent] use of the term 'substantial evidence."' Jackson v. Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co., 422 F.2d 1272, 1277 (8th Cir.) (Lay, J., concurring), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 855
(1970). The Supreme Court in Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S.
276 (1966) stated that "judicial review is generally limited to ascertaining whether the evi-
dence relied upon by the trier of fact was of sufficient quality and substantiality to support
the rationality of the judgment." Id. at 282.
140. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). See Steadman v.
SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 101 n.21 (1981) C'[T]he substantial-evidence test became the scope-of-
review standard because of a desire to have courts review agency decisionmaking more care-
fully than under the then prevalent scintilla-of-evidence-test.").
141. NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939).
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standard, like the "clearly erroneous" standard, is strikingly simi-
lar to jury instructions on burdens of proof and is at least as clear.
The controversy over the proper standard of appellate review
remains:
A formula for judicial review of administrative action may afford grounds for
certitude but cannot assure certainty of application. Some scope for judicial
discretion in applying the formula can be avoided only by falsifying the ac-
tual process of judging or by using the formula as an instrument of futile
casuistry.1 42
The "clearly erroneous" and "substantial evidence" standards are
arguably so close in meaning that the choice between them will
make no difference in whether an appellate court reverses. 143 Thus,
measuring the two standards in terms of percentages probably
would not decrease the strong disagreements over which standard
ought to govern appellate review. Unlike the gradual growth in
clarity of the standard used in situations such as frisks1 4 4 and the
possibility for the same growth in various other posttrial situa-
tions,145 the standards for appellate review do not need clarifica-
tion. Acceptance of the "clearly erroneous" standard, however,
may be growing, if greater uniformity in application is indicative of
assent.14
6
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND SYMBOLIC FUNCTIONS OF BURDENS OF
PROOF
During the last decade the Supreme Court has dealt with the
values that trial burdens of proof express. The Court has concen-
trated not only on criminal cases but also on serious civil suits con-
cerning deprivation of liberty and important personal rights, such
as civil commitment, loss of citizenship, and termination of paren-
tal rights. In effect, the Court has constitutionalized burdens of
proof. As the most recent civil cases show, the Court's articulation
of the function of burdens of proof in supporting societal values
has grown clearer, although factflnders and other decisionmakers
today do not enjoy similar clarity about the meaning of particular
burdens of proof. Nonetheless, decisionmakers continue to disagree
142. Universal Camara Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488-89 (1951).
143. See NLRB v. Southland Mfg. Co., 201 F.2d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1952).
144. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
146. See Note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) and the Scope of Appellate
Fact Review: Has Application of the Clearly Erroneous Rule Been Clearly Erroneous?, 52
ST. JOHN's L. REy. 68, 84, 90 (1977).
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about the meaning and role of burdens of proof.
The state initiates many of the civil suits concerning impor-
tant individual rights, and, thus, questions arise concerning funda-
mental fairness and fourteenth amendment due process rights for
the individual. The Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge" 7 set
forth three considerations that courts must weigh to determine
what procedures due process requires: (1) the private interest to be
determined in the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the
state's proceeding; and (3) the state's interest in using that partic-
ular type of proceeding.1 48 Under this balancing test the allocation
of due process rights for the individual litigant usually includes a
provision for notice, a hearing, and, in some instances, counsel.
Federal courts usually do not address the burden of proof to apply
at the hearing, or they just leave that decision to the discretion of
the states. 49 For example, the Court in Morrissey v. Brewer18 0 con-
cluded simply that final hearings must be based on more than
"probable cause."1 51 In some recent cases, however, the Court has
chosen to single out the role of burdens of proof in ensuring the
process due. These cases have focused on the symbolic role of bur-
dens of proof in promoting the societal values at stake in the
litigation.
In Addington v. Texas 52 the Court emphasized that burdens
of proof not only indicate the degree of belief required for the par-
ticular type of case, but also underscore the relative societal impor-
tance attached to the decision in the particular type of case. The
Court recognized that "the law has produced across a continuum
three standards or levels of proof for different types of cases."""
While burdens of proof analyzed from the point of view of the
decisionmaker emphasize degrees of belief and the operation of
probability theory, the same burdens examined from the point of
view of societal values focus on the risk that the decision is incor-
rect. The risk element reflects societal values because society es-
tablishes the permissible risk in accordance with the due process
requirements of the fourteenth amendment. The less important
147. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
148. Id. at 335.
149. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (probable cause to detain); Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation revocation); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1
(1970) (probable cause to indict).
150. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
151. Id. at 488.
152. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
153. Id. at 423.
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the outcome to societal values, the more society wishes to minimize
the risk of an incorrect verdict. Thus, in purely private disputes
plaintiffs and defendants bear equally the risks of an erroneous
verdict. The private character of the suit is what leads the Court to
accept preponderance of the evidence as the appropriate burden of
proof in the usual civil suit. "At one end of the spectrum is the
typical civil case involving a monetary dispute between private
parties. .. . [S]ociety has a minimal concern with the outcome of
such private suits. .... 1" By contrast, when the state initiates a
civil suit to decide an individual's important rights protected by
the Constitution, "[t]he interests at stake in those cases are
deemed to be more substantial than mere loss of money and some
jurisdictions accordingly reduce the risk to the defendant of having
his reputation tarnished erroneously by increasing the plaintiff's
burden of proof."155 Thus, the Court utilizes the "clear and con-
vincing evidence" standard to reflect the more important interests
at stake in state-initiated civil cases and quasi-criminal suits. Since
the symbolic choice of this burden purposefully alters the alloca-
tion of the risk of an erroneous decision, the individual whose im-
portant rights are at issue bears less of the risk of loss than those
parties whose claims are decided by a "preponderance of the
evidence."
The Court does not attach a percentage of certainty to any
burden-but abstracts from the probability theory a risk of loss fac-
tor. The isolated risk factor, however, represents the symbolism of
each burden of proof. In a "preponderance" standard the parties
bear the risk of an erroneous verdict equally. In a "clear and con-
vincing" standard the state bears more of the risk than the indi-
vidual. In a "reasonable doubt" standard society bears "almost the
entire risk of error. ' 15' The Court in Speiser v. Randall 157 ex-
plained the rationale for isolating the risk factor in burdens of
proof to symbolize the protection of societal values:
There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfind-
ing, which both parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake
an interest of transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-this
margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other
party the burden of. . .persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the
trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.1
154. Id.
155. Id. at 424.
156. Id. at 428.
157. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
158. Id. at 525-26.
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Similarly, the Court in In re Winship " suggested that placing this
risk factor on the prosecution reassures society:
[U]se of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the
respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law.
It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a
standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are be-
ing condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual
going about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his government cannot
adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper
factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.1"
The ambiguity in jury instructions and the consequent possi-
ble lack of jurors' comprehension of the certainty required in the
particular decision may affect the operation of the symbolic func-
tion of burdens of proof.161 In addition, the jurors may be unaware
of the symbolic significance of the particular burden of proof that
the judge instructs them to apply.1 2 The Addington Court noted
this possibility, but offered no solution. "Candor suggests that, to a
degree, efforts to analyze what lay jurors understand concerning
the differences among these three tests or the nuances of a judge's
instructions on the law may well be largely an academic exercise
. . "1 3 The Court nevertheless insisted that society's choice of a
burden of proof to comport with the constitutional requirements of
due process reflects the societal values at issue. Yet if jurors who
receive instructions about the applicable burdens of proof do not
understand the instructions, then the standards probably do not
successfully instill the desired confidence in "every individual."
Since the differences in outcome resulting from the symbolic func-
tion of burdens of proof are more likely to occur on appeal, the
Court perhaps is relying on the appellate process to implement the
symbolic function of burdens of proof. In this event the Court as-
sumes that the symbolic function of burdens of proof operates in
each case to be decided, and "'reflects the value society places on
individual liberty.""
The Court may be on firmer ground about the symbolism of
the "reasonable doubt" standard when it speaks of "society" rather
159. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
160. Id. at 364. See Allen, The Restoration of In Re Winship: A Comment on Burdens
of Persuasion in Criminal Cases after Patterson v. New York, 76 MCH. L. REv. 30 (1977).
161. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424-25 (1979).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 424.
164. Id. at 425 (quoting Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir. 1971)
(Sobeloff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. dismissed sub nom. Murel v.
Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972)).
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than each individual. In Patterson v. New York165 the Court at-
tempted to specify the risks society has assumed:
The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case is
"bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.". . . The
social cost of placing the burden on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt is thus an increased risk that the guilty will go free. While
it is clear that our society has willingly chosen to bear a substantial burden in
order to protect the innocent, it is equally clear that the risk it must bear is
not without limits."1
The use of percentages may help explain the risk that society has
assumed. If "beyond a reasonable doubt" is set at 95%, the risk
factor shows that society prefers twenty guilty to go free before the
conviction of one innocent person. Similarly, if a "reasonable
doubt" requires 99% certainty, the risk factor indicates that one
hundred guilty people go free. This risk factor, consistently em-
phasized by the Court, determines the Court's choice of a burden
of proof in accordance with the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.1 67
The Supreme Court's most recent application of the symbolic
function of burdens of proof is Santosky v. Kramer.1e8 The sole
question for the Court was whether this standard was the proper
burden of proof under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. In Santosky the state brought neglect proceedings in
family court to terminate petitioners' rights as natural parents in
their three children. 169 State law permitted the family court judge
to terminate permanently the natural parents' rights in the child if
the state supported its allegations by "a fair preponderance of the
evidence. 17' The Court ordered a new hearing using the "clear and
convincing evidence" standard and suggested that the higher bur-
den of proof would have "both practical and symbolic conse-
quences" in the present case.17 1 According to the Court, the true
parties in the suit were the state and the natural parents.17 2 The
165. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
166. Id. at 208.
167. The court in In Re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973), related the degree of
certainty to the risk of loss: "Broadly stated, the standard of proof reflects the risk of win-
ning or losing a given adversary proceeding or, stated differently, the certainty with which
the party bearing the burden of proof must convince the factfinder." Id. at 662.
168. 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982).
169. Id. at 1393.
170. N.Y. FAm. CT. AcT. § 622 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1981-82).
171. 102 S. Ct. at 1400.
172. Id. at 1397.
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Court discounted the child's risk of an "erroneous failure to termi-
nate" since the child in the event of an erroneous decision only
would continue to live in a state institution or foster home and
remain unavailable for adoption. The "relative severity" for the
parents is greater, however, since the parents will lose all opportu-
nity to establish a permanent home with this child. 17 3 On the con-
trary, the child, although less adoptable as it grows older, never-
theless still may be adopted if a future termination proceeding
proves judicially successful.17 4 In effect, the Court's conclusion is
that the higher burden of "clear and convincing evidence" will re-
duce the risk of erroneous termination. The majority assumes that
the use of a higher burden of proof "will impress the factfinder
with the importance of the decision. 17 5 That practical effect how-
ever, will not follow, if the factfinder is unclear about the meaning
of the burden he must apply. The "clear and convincing" standard
"adequately conveys to the factfinder the level of subjective cer-
tainty about his factual conclusion necessary to satisfy due pro-
cess"1 7 6 only if the factfinder understands it.
The dissent in Santosky agreed that "normally, the standard
of proof is a crucial factor in the final outcome .... " According
to the dissent, however, the state had identified correctly the inter-
ests and had balanced the rights possessed by the child with those
of the natural parents .1 8 Thus, "preponderance" is a constitution-
ally permissible standard.27 The Santosky majority and dissent
clearly demonstrate their agreement that probability theory oper-
ates to allow factfinders to know when they have reached their de-
cision properly. The majority and dissent also agree that the choice
of a burden of proof reflects the acceptable risk factor for an erro-
neous determination. The disagreement is over the interests being
balanced in this case. Thus, the symbolic applicability of "clear
and convincing evidence" does not command the consistent action
of the Court that "beyond a reasonable doubt" does. These devia-
tions by decisionmakers on the practical meaning of burdens of
proof could affect the outcome in the marginal cases perhaps as
much as the choice of a burden of proof itself.
173. Id. at 1400-01.
174. Id. at 1407.
175. Id. at 1400.
176. Id. at 1402-03.
177. Id. at 1411 n.12 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 1412-13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 1411-12 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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V. JUDICIAL SURVEY ON BURDENS OF PROOF
Surveys of judges and juries over the last half century have
shown that these decisionmakers are not unanimous in their defi-
nitions of various burdens of proof.18 0 Judge Weinstein has sug-
gested that wide variation among decisionmakers justifies a "high
probability requirement in criminal cases partly on the ground
that some triers would tend to shave the barriers to a finding of
guilt."1 ' In United States v. Fatico182 Judge Weinstein surveyed
the judges in the Eastern District of New York about their assess-
ment of probabilities for four burdens of proof.18 3 Table 1 sets
forth the results of Judge Weinstein's survey:
TABLE 1
PROBABILITIES AssocIATED WITH STANDARDS OF PROOF
JUDGES EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Judge Preponderance Clear and Clear, Uniquivocal Beyond a
Convincing and Convincing Reasonable Doubt
1 50+% 60-70% 65-75% 80%
2 50+% 67% 70% 76%
3 50+% 60% 70% 85%
4 51% 65% 67% 90%
5 50+ % Standard is Elusive 90%
and Unhelpful
6 50+% 70+% 70+% 85%
7 50+% 70+% 80+% 95%
8 50.1% 75% 75% 85%
9 50+% 60% 90% 85%
10 51% Cannot Estimate Numerically
Source: United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
Judge Weinstein's survey of judges provided the format for a simi-
lar questionnaire sent to all active, senior, and retired federal
180. See H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEiSEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 187 (1966); Becker, Surveys
and Judiciaries or Who's Afraid of the Purple Curtain?, 1 LAW AND Soc'Y REV. 133 (1967);
Simon, Judges' Translations of Burdens of Proof into Statements of Probability, 13 TRIAL
LAW GUIDE 103 (1969); Simon & Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof, 5 LAW AND SOC'Y
REv. 319 (1971); Winter, The Jury and the Risk of Nonpersuasion, 5 LAW AND Soc'y REV.
335 (1971); L.S.E. Jury Project, Juries and the Rules of Evidence, [1973] CRIM. L. REv. 208;
Trial by Jury, supra note 12, at 192.
181. United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
182. Id.
183. The Supreme Court has used occasionally the fourth burden of proof, "clear, une-
quivocal, and convincing evidence," which is simply a variation on "clear and convincing
evidence." See supra note 118; see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424, 432 (1979);
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 55, at 796; 9 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2498 (3d ed. 1940).
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judges in 1981.8 The results of that survey are produced in tabu-
lar form below.
A. Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
In the present survey 171 judges assigned a percentage to "be-
yond a reasonable doubt." Table 2 sets forth the results:
TABLE 2
PERCENTAGES AssoCIATED WrrH BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
Percentage Number of Judges
50%
55%
60%
65%
70%
75%
80%
85%
90%
91%
92%
93%
94%
95%
96%
97%
98%
99%
100%
Source: author survey
184. The author sent to all federal district and circuit judges and justices of the
United States Supreme Court questionnaires asking for comparative numerical ranking of
nine phrases treated as burdens of proof and absolute definitions of the certainty required
by each phrase on a scale of zero percent to 100%. The nine phrases are "beyond a reasona-
ble doubt," "probable cause to believe," "reasonable cause to believe," "reasonable suspi-
cion," "clear and convincing evidence," "clearly erroneous," "substantial evidence," "pre-
ponderance of the evidence," and "more probable than not." The numerical rankings permit
easier tabulation. One hundred ninety-five judges filled out and returned the questionnaire.
Of these 195, 28 did not rank all the burdens numerically and their results on the ranking
could not be tabulated. In addition, 60 judges expressed their attitudes toward burdens of
proof in letter form, thus giving a total of 255 useful responses.-Twenty-one judges wrote
letters stating either that they do not answer questionnaires or that they do not answer
them without official sponsorship from an agency such as the Federal Judicial Center or the
Administrative Office of the Courts. Two judges simply wrote to express their criticism of
the project. Several other judges' staffs wrote to say that the judge was ill or an inactive
senior judge.
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No judge thought that "beyond a reasonable doubt" meant less
than fifty percent certainty. Twenty-one judges assigned 100% to
"beyond a reasonable doubt." Three of these judges explained why
"beyond a reasonable doubt" is 100%. According to one judge,
"proof beyond a reasonable doubt must be 100% beyond a reason-
able doubt, and if there is any reasonable doubt, it is in the degree
of 0% so far as the burden of proof goes." Another judge cited
Devitt and Blackmar 18 5 to show that "beyond a reasonable doubt,"
"preponderance of the evidence," and "substantial evidence" each
required 100% certainty. Finally, one judge cautioned against
reading too much into the answers of respondents and explained
that he could not fill out the questionnaire partly because of his
analysis of "beyond a reasonable doubt": "(1) Assume all the evi-
dence is before the court. (2) Discard any evidence which creates
doubts which are unreasonable, and is therefore incredible. (3) One
hundred percent of the remaining reasonable and credible evidence
must mandate a guilty verdict."18 The views of this third judge
comport with Tribe's views: the factfinder must be certain of guilt
and have no doubts except unreasonable or fanciful doubts.1 87 Pro-
fessor (now Judge) Winter, commenting on a prior survey of jurors
and judges, suggests that judges should instruct the jury to return
a guilty verdict only if (1) it "believes" subjectively in the defen-
dant's guilt and (2) the "probability is as great" as the jury itself
requires to risk comparable interests of its own.1a8 The jury, in
Judge Winter's view, should act as the voice of the community in
185. E. DEVITr & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS (3d ed.
1977).
186. The table does not include this conclusion, since the judge did not fill out the
questionnaire. In Professor Simon's survey of 400 responding state and federal judges, ap-
proximately one-third of the judges placed "reasonable doubt" at more than 80%, one-third
at 90-95%, and one-third at 100%. Simon, supra note 180, at 108. Professor Underwood
opines that the "judges may have been stating what they thought was correct legal doctrine,
rather than describing what they would do as judges." Underwood, The Thumb on the
Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1311 n.46
(1977). She gives no reason for this assumption. Simon asked the judges to rate "beyond a
reasonable doubt" and "preponderance of the evidence" on a scale of 1 to 10 with respect to
(a) how they personally would rate them; (b) how they thought a juror would rate them; and
(c) how they should be rated in a bench trial. Simon, supra note 180, at 106-07. The distri-
butions were "almost identical across the three situations." Id. at 108.
187. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics, supra note 9, at 1372-75. Weinstein adheres to the
better majority view: beyond a reasonable doubt "can never be set as certainty or 100%
probability.... Setting the standard at 100% in order to avoid any chance of convicting
the innocent would thus result in a zero conviction rate and acquittal of all the guilty."
United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 411 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
188. Winter, supra note 180, at 342.
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setting "how much risk of convicting an innocent man can be
taken. 18 9
B. Probable Cause and Reasonable Cause
In the present survey 166 judges assigned a percentage to
"probable cause to believe" and "reasonable cause to believe." Ta-
ble 3 sets forth the results:
TABLE 3
PERCENTAGES AssociATED WITH PROBABLE
CAUSE AND REASONABLE CAUSE
Probable Cause Reasonable Cause
Percentage Number of Percentage Number of
Judges Judges
10% 2 10% 3
20% 5 20% 9
30% 27 30% 52
40% 44 40% 32
50% 52 50% 40
60% 25 60% 22
70% 8 70% 5
80% 2 80% 1
90% 1 90% 1
100% 1
Source: author survey
Although the Supreme Court equates "probable cause" and
"reasonable cause," 1 0 the judges responding to the survey assessed
"reasonable cause" to require less certainty than "probable cause."
"Probable cause" perhaps suggests by its name just over 50% cer-
tainty.191 Nonetheless, the survey suggests that the connotation of
"probable cause" has changed because "probable cause" originally
did not import probabilistic notions.19 2
C. Reasonable Suspicion
In the present survey 164 judges assigned a percentage to rea-
189. Id.
190. See supra notes 60 & 71-76, and accompanying texts. See also Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949);
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975).
191. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 65. Percentages were not assigned to burdens of proof during the
eighteenth century, nor do they convey the primary meaning of the warrant clause of the
fourth amendment. For an early attempt to treat burdens of proof as degrees of belief, see 1
J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDiciAL EVmENCE 71-109 (1827).
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sonable suspicion. Table 4 sets forth the results:
TABLE 4
PERCENTAGES ASSOCIATED WITH REASONABLE SUSPICION
Percentage
0%
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90%
100%
Source: author survey
Number of
Judges
2
One judge who completed the other parts of the questionnaire
left out "reasonable suspicion" because he had "never heard of this
one." A few other judges felt that ex parte investigative stan-
dards-including "probable cause" and "reasonable cause"--
should not be considered burdens of proof and could not be com-
pared with the burdens of proof used at trial.
D. Clear and Convincing Evidence
In the present survey 170 judges assigned a percentage to
"clear and convincing evidence." Table 5 sets forth the results:
TABLE 5
PERCENTAGES ASSOCIATED WITH CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE
Percentage Number of
Judges
50%
55%
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80%
85%
90%
95%
100%
Source: author survey
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The judges in Judge Weinstein's survey assessed "clear and
convincing evidence" to be between 60% and 75%. In the present
survey 112 of the 172 judges rate "clear and convincing evidence"
between 70% and 80%. While Weinstein's survey ranked "clear,
unequivocal and convincing evidence" as a separate burden, which
perhaps accounts for the differentiations in the two surveys, the
judges in Judge Weinstein's survey ranked "reasonable doubt" be-
tween 76% and 95%, with only one judge rating "reasonable
doubt" at 95%. The relative closeness of the percentage ratings
between the "clear, unequivocal and convincing" standard and the
"reasonable doubt" standard in the Judge Weinstein survey sug-
gests that "clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence" may be al-
most as severe a burden as "reasonable doubt," or as the "reasona-
ble doubt" standard for civil cases. Indeed, one judge in Judge
Weinstein's survey rated the "clear and unequivocal" standard at
90% and "reasonable doubt" at 85%. The ten judges in Judge
Weinstein's survey nevertheless seem to rate both the "clear and
convincing standard" and the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing"
standard fairly low. Judge Weinstein's survey, however, does sug-
gest that the courts do not need a fourth standard and that such a
standard is extremely difficult to differentiate from the other three
burdens, which judges rate very closely on the scale. The prolifera-
tion of standards does little to clarify the level of certainty needed
for the decision in question.
E. Clearly Erroneous and Substantial Evidence
In the present survey 153 judges assessed the "clearly errone-
ous" standard in percentages and 162 judges assessed "substantial
evidence." Table 6 sets forth the results:
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TABLE 6
PERCENTAGES ASSOCIATED WITH CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
AND SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Clearly Erroneous Substantial Evidence
Percentage Number of Percentage Number of
Judges Judges
20% 2 10% 2
30% 5 20% 7
40% 2 30% 25
50% 8 40% 40
60% 14 50% 25
70% 28 60% 29
80% 50 70% 18
90% 29 80% 13
100% 15 90% 2
100% 1
Source: author survey
While the "clearly erroneous" standard traditionally provides
for a broader scope of review than "substantial evidence,"""3 many
more judges thought that the reviewing court had to have greater
certainty before reversing a decision under the "clearly erroneous"
standard. Several judges noted that standards for judicial review
and administrative standards should not be considered burdens of
proof. More of those judges objected to the inclusion of "clearly
erroneous." One circuit judge observed that the judicial system
"places confidence" in the factfinders and wishes to leave it to
them. Another circuit judge, formerly a district judge, stated that
evidence can be quantified at the trial level but not on appeal. A
third judge talked about the "factfinder mind set and the appellate
mind set" to explain the relatively few reversals of criminal convic-
tions as compared with administrative decisions, stating in effect
that types of cases override considerations of burdens of proof. An-
other judge expressed a similar thought by stating that the diffi-
culty of the burden of proof may matter little in terms of the diffi-
culties inherent in obtaining a reversal on appeal; focusing on
burdens of proof, he said, is misleading.
F. Preponderance and More Probable Than Not
In the present survey 175 judges assessed "preponderance of
the evidence" and 174 judges assessed "more probable than not."
193. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
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Table 7 sets forth the results:
TABLE 7
PERCENTAGES ASSOCIATED WITH PREPONDERANCE
AND MORE PROBABLE THAN NOT
Preponderance of the Evidence
Percentage Number of
Judges
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More Probable Than Not
Percentage Number of
Judges
20% 3
25% 0
30% 1
35% 1
40% 3
45% 2
50% 108
55% 24
60% 23
65% 4
70% 2
75% 3
Source: author survey
While the definition of "preponderance of the evidence" is
"more probable than not,' '"1  the judges rated "preponderance"
higher than "more probable than not." Winter suggests that be-
cause of television shows, jurors have heard only of "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" and do not know the difference between the bur-
dens in civil and criminal cases.1' 5 They therefore apply "beyond a
reasonable doubt" in civil cases. Winter's solution is to instruct the
jury (1) that "beyond a reasonable doubt" is for criminal cases and
(2) that if the parties tie, the defendant wins.'" Winter suggests
that the judge's emphasis on that difference between civil and
criminal burdens of proof easily can cure the jurors' error.1 97
G. Burdens of Proof in General
In the present survey 167 judges ranked the nine burdens of
proof on a descending scale from nine to one. Table 8 sets forth
the average ranking and percentage of probabilities:
194. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 55, at 794.
195. Winter, supra note 180, at 337-38.
196. Id. at 339.
197. Id. at 338.
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TABLE 8
AVERAGE RANKING AND PERCENTAGE OF
PROBABILITIES OF BURDENS OF PROOF
Burden of Proof Average Average Number of
Ranking Percentage Judges
beyond a reasonable 8.85 90.28% (171 judges)
doubt
clear and convincing 7.39 74.99% (170 judges)
evidence
clearly erroneous 7.08 73.83% (153 judges)
preponderance of the 5.35 55.33% (175 judges)
evidence
more probable than not 4.50 52.56% (174 judges)
substantial evidence 4.18 48.63% (162 judges)
probable cause to 3.23 44.52% (166 judges)
believe
reasonable cause to 2.78 40.73% (166 judges)
believe
reasonable suspicion 1.26 29.59% (164 judges)
Source: author survey
Several judges who wrote letters rather than filling out the
questionnaire directed their comments to their inability to use per-
centages. The most common complaint was that percentages are
misleading because burdens of proof deal with qualitative judg-
ments rather than quantitative judgments. Other comments in-
cluded: percentages (1) do not lead to certainty; (2) they are too
theoretical; (3) they are mechanical, unrealistic, and unknown to
the law; (4) they are not the terms in which judges think; (5) they
change their meanings according to their contexts; and (6) they are
only the "multiplier" and the judge does not know what the "mul-
tiplicand" should be. Most judges who filled out the questionnaire,
however, said little about percentages. 198
Other judges criticized the ranking of burdens of proof by
number and stated that the practice is misleading. The phrases
used in the survey, they argued, were not all burdens of proof, such
as standards of appellate or administrative review and requests for
ex parte investigative actions. Several judges said that the class of
case is the important factor-not the burden of proof-since the
context of a particular case plays a large role in many judgments of
whether a litigant has met the prescribed burden. Indeed, one
198. Professor Simon specifically polled the judges for a policy recommendation on the
use of percentages or probabilities: "The judges were almost unanimous in their rejection of
the proposal for both criminal and civil trials." Simon, supra note 180, at 113.
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judge suggested that without a case to be decided, any statement
on burdens is purely "subjective." Other comments included the
following: The same words have "different meanings" in different
contexts. "Simplicity" (simplification of the present burdens of
proof) will not increase certainty, fairness, or justice. Burdens of
proof are "semantics." Burdens are "only for lay people," with "no
meaning in the theory or practice of law." One judge said that the
only meaningful statement about burdens is, "Are the factfinders
satisfied?" Several judges said that the need to compare two bur-
dens of proof had never confronted them in a case and that they
therefore found the questionnaire an artificial exercise. One judge
said he was "not prepared to make the fine distinctions required"
by the survey.
The judges who do not find burdens of proof useful simply will
ignore a proliferation of burdens. The proliferation, meanwhile,
simply will confuse those judges who find the concept useful. Thus,
fine calibrations with different phrases and percentages assigned to
each phrase will not contribute to better or easier decisionmaking.
VI. CONCLUSION
The symbolic and practical functions of burdens of proof ap-
pear to operate independently of one another in the opinions of
the United States Supreme Court, perhaps because the Court has
exercised little control over the practical operation of burdens of
proof in the outcome of a decision. Nevertheless, the Court ulti-
mately interrelates both functions because it uses the symbolic role
of burdens to select the particular burden to apply in the various
types of cases.199 The constitutionalization of stop-and-frisk proce-
dures in the last fifteen years demonstrates most clearly how the
symbolism of the interests at stake influence the level of certainty
required to reach a decision. Before the Supreme Court recognized
stop-and-frisk as an investigative tool of law enforcement, uniform
judicial oversight of fourth amendment protections against the
patdown was rare. Upon initial judicial recognition of the patdown,
the Court left its delineation of "reasonable" police procedures
vague by utilizing the "unreflective and reflexive action" standard.
As judicial control over "reasonable suspicion" grew, the balance
between the significance to society of law enforcement operations
and the importance of the individual's constitutional rights made
the standard of "reasonable suspicion" for a patdown more severe.
199. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-26 (1979).
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Although the Court clarified its own thinking, the constitutional
standard of "reasonable suspicion" can only achieve its practical
purpose if it deters illegal police misconduct. If general police will-
ingness to comply with constitutional standards exists, then law
enforcement officers and the neutral magistrates and judges who
make the finding of constitutionality must have clear guidelines
from the Court to make their everyday, working decisions. Only
clarity in the practical role of "reasonable suspicion" will promote
greater uniformity in the application of fourth amendment safe-
guards by initial decisionmakers.
While the Court has clarified the "reasonable suspicion" stan-
dard, it has not provided juries any significantly better guidance in
reaching their decisions. The emergence of the "clearly erroneous"
standard for use in significant civil suits by the federal or state
government against an individual may or may not impress the
factfinders with the importance of the decision to be made.200 Fur-
ther, the "clearly erroneous" standard may not give the deci-
sionmaker a clear guideline with respect to the level of certainty
required to reach a decision. While the factfinder may recognize
the importance of the individual's right being decided in the case
whatever the burden of proof, the explanation of the burdens may
not alert the factfinder to the required certainty. Indeed, the Su-
preme Court itself refers to the misleading aspects in the nomen-
clature of "preponderance of the evidence" as a reason to require
"clear and convincing evidence" in important civil cases brought
by the government against an individual.201 Jury instructions on
these burdens, however, may impress the factfinder only with the
notion that it is not to apply the "reasonable doubt standard."
Thus, the factfinder may not know whether to apply the "reasona-
ble doubt standard," particularly if it has heard of neither of the
other standards apart from the reference in the jury instruc-
tions.0 2 Winter points out that even those private individuals in-
volved in suits to which a "preponderance" standard applies de-
serve to have their interests decided on the basis of
"preponderance" and not on a higher burden.20
Uniformity, to the extent that it is possible to achieve, is like-
wise desirable for standards used by judges. Moreover, uniformity
is essential if judges are to treat like cases alike and promote the
200. Id. at 427.
201. Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1400 (1982).
202. Larson v. Jo Ann Cab Corp., 209 F.2d 929, 929-30 (1954).
203. Winter, supra note 180, at 336.
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integrity of the judicial system. Indeed, lack of uniformity of appli-
cation in appellate review standards troubles the commentators
more than the expansion in recent decades of the reviewing powers
of the appellate courts.0 4 While the application of probability the-
ory and percentages to burdens of proof never may-and perhaps
never should-find its way into jury instructions, the use of per-
centages clearly demonstrates that a proliferation of burdens of
proof will not aid decisionmaking. Decisionmakers must have a
clearly prescribed level of certainty; proliferation of burdens, how-
ever, will give rise only to more confusing terminology and will re-
sult in multiple burdens of proof occupying the same points on the
scale. The use of percentages in analyzing burdens of proof also
demonstrates that the need to clarify jury confusion about the
meaning of the various burdens is as pressing now as it was half a
century ago. Perhaps judges can prevent misapplication of the bur-
dens in marginal cases by giving the jury a definition of the "pre-
ponderance" standard and the "clear and convincing evidence"
standard in terms of the other standards. Greater precision in the
use of currently existing burdens and arrest of the proliferation of
new phrases intended to convey burdens of proof only can contrib-
ute to better decisionmaking and greater respect for the integrity
of the judicial system.
204. See, e.g., Nangle, supra note 135, at 416.
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